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Promissory Restraints
A promissory restraint is found in those situations where there is
an agreement not to alienate, either in the form of a covenant in a
conveyance or lease, or a contract with respect to the sale of an
interest in land. The validity of such restraints is important m determining whether such agreements will be specifically enforced. In
most jurisdictions, the validity of promissory restraints on real property is determined in the same way as is the validity of analagous
forfeiture restraints.31 As in the case of a forfeiture restraint, a
promissory restraint may be dispensed with if all the parties concerned agree to do so. In this respect these two types differ from
the disabling restraint under which property cannot thereafter be
alienated even though all the parties so desire. This apparently is
the reason why promissory restraints are treated similarly to forfeiture restraints, despite the fact that they more closely resemble
disabling restraints in form.
In last analysis, a given rule on alienation is a result of balancing
the beneficial character of the purposes of the restraint as against the
extent to which alienability would be hindered, if the provision in
question were held valid. While courts seldom have much to say
about purpose, it is a most important factor in determining the character of the rule. One may well anticipate that, in thq face of new
purposes which are definitely in accord with good public policy, the
courts may make new exceptions to the old doctrines with respect to
direct restraints.
CHAmRLs R. GROMLEY

REMEDIES OF GOOD FAITH OCCUPIER WHO HAS
IMPROVED LAND - IN KENTUCKY
Courts have long been faced with the problem of providing an
adequate remedy for the good faith purchaser of land who makes
valuable improvements thereon, and is later ejected from the land
because of a superior title in a third person. The purchaser, usually
called an "occupying claimant", cannot recover the improvements
themselves where they have become a part of the realty, but since
he has expended a sum of money and enhanced the value of another s
property because of an honest mistake, the law should afford hin
' Snibs,

op. cit. supra, note 1, at 355.
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some relief. The need for a remedy may be more clearly illustrated
by the following hypothetical fact situation.
Suppose A purchases land in good faith from B, who had obtained
a deed to the land from one who had an imperfect record title and
no title by adverse possession. A, reasonably believing that he has
title, builds a $10,000 house on the land. C, the true owner, proves
his superior title, and ejects A from the land. Is A entitled to recover
any of the money he has expended? If he can, what is the measure
of damages and what is the proper method to determine them? It is
the purpose of this note to discuss the possible remedies of A in
Kentucky.
Statutory Remedy
Most states, including Kentucky, have so-called "betterment acts"
or "occupying claimants statutes" enacted for the benefit of a claimant who finds himself in the position described in the hypothetical
situation. Kentucky s statute is typical.'
"If any person, believing himself to be the owner by reason of a

claim m law or equity founded on a public record, peacefully occupies and miproves any land, and the land, upon judicial investigation,
is held to belong to another, the value of the improvements shall be
paid by the successful party to the occupant, or the person under
whom and for whom he entered and holds, before the court rendering judgment or decree of eviction causes the possession to be delivered to the successful party." (Italics writer s)

By the literal wording of the statute, it would seem that a claimant could recover the value of any improvements from the successful
party in the forcible detainer action. And indeed, in a majority of
states having similar statutes, he can 2 recover if he is in good faith
and has color of title but in Kentucky, under an old interpretation of
the phrase, "founded on a public record," the claimant can recover
nothing unless he can trace his chain of title back to the Commonwealth. Under the assumed facts of the hypothetical case, A obtamed the property from B under a faulty title, thus As claim in law
is not founded on a public record. The Kentucky Court has consistently held that the claimant must be able to trace title back to the
grant of a patent.3 Apparently, there are two exceptions to this
'Ky.

REv. STAT.

2

381.460 (1948).

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, see. 625 (3rd ed.,
STrrToN, see. 42, comment, subsection 1 (1937).

'Golden

1939);

RESTATENMENT, RE-

v. Blakeman, 223 Ky. 517, 519, 3 S.W 2d 1095, 1096 (1928);

Wintersinith v. Pnce, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2005, 66 S.W 2 (1902); See, Hardin v.
Robinson, 24:3 Ky. 648, 652, 49 S.W 2d 563, 564 (1932); Darnell v. Jones, 24
Kv. L. Rep. 2090, 2092, 72 S.W 1108, 1109 (1903); Shaw v. Robinson, 111 Ky.
715, 723, 64 S.W 620, 623 (1901).
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rather harsh rule: first, where a purchaser is in possession under a
judgment awarding land to hin, 4 and second, where a bona fide
purchaser at a judicial sale, later held void, makes improvements
thereon.5
It will immediately be perceived that such an interpretation of the
statute limits the number of recoveries under it, and this observation
is substantiated by a dearth of litigation under the statute. It is interesting to analyze the early decisions under the Kentucky Occupying Claimants Act, and to discover the reasoning underlying this
unique interpretation.
Probably the first case under the act was Clay v Miller,0 decided
in 1816. In holding that the occupant could not recover, the court
gave a very inadequate explanation, amounting to little more than a
mere conclusion of law It said, "The foundation of Miller s claim is,
therefore, the deed from Williams, unconnected with any deduction
of title from the Commonwealth; and as such we cannot suppose
he has brought himself within the occupying claimant law "7
The case of Lewis v Singletons gives some insight into the historical rationalization of the peculiar Kentucky rule. It seems that
in England and Virginia controversies about title to land were settled
by tracing the title back to the original grant from the crown. When
the proper title was determined, principles of equity were invoked,
and if by a reasonable search of title, a man could have discovered
the defect, he was unable to recover. So, according to our court,
when the Kentucky Legislature enacted the statute, it intended such
a test to be carried over into our law The land problem in Kentucky
was rather complicated since the land had been derived from Virginia. As a result, there was a maze of overlapping patents from
Virginia and Kentucky and also many conflicting junior and senior
patents. With this situation in mind, the Kentucky Court may well
have been justified in feeling that the Legislature intended such an
interpretation. The court pointed out, "If, in scrutinizing his title,
either legal or equitable, he could arrive at the foundation, without
defects, in some public record, or in other words, some office where
to
the appropriation was allowed by the government to be made
such cases the statute peculiarly and exclusively applies."
The leading case in Kentucky, Fairbarnv Means, ° reaffirms this
"See, Kidd v. Roundtree, 285 Ky. 442, 444, 148 S.W 2d 275, 276 (1941).
Ky. 157, 158, 75 S.W 2d 1080, 1081 (1934).
v. Foster,
'See,
461 256
(1816).
'7 Ky.Soper
(4 Bibb.)
Id. at 461.
89 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 214 (1820).
9

id. at 215.
1061 Ky. (4 Met.) 323 (1863).
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rule, and m applying it points out that mere belief that the title is
traceable to a patent is insufficient. It was held that there must in
fact be an uninterrupted chain of title. The plaintiff who had made
miprovements claimed the land under a junior patent to Bryant. One
of the links in their chain of title was a deed executed in 1815, by a
sheriff, conveying the land to Young, in pursuance of a sale executed
for taxes. It was not shown that the officer had authority to sell the
land. The defendant had obtained the land as heirs of a senior
patentee. Recovery was denied under the statute because of the
break in the chain of title. The Court felt that the belief referred to
in the statute was one which may only be judicially determined, and
which, therefore, must be founded upon the fact that the occupant
holds a title granted by the Commonwealth. The Court said that it
was impossible to determine just what actual belief the claimant had.
The court also felt that the intent of the statute was to relieve occupants holding apparent, but invalid, titles granted by the state.
It is submitted that the basic reason laid down by the court, in
applying such a narrow interpretation to the situation in the Fatrbaum
case, was the historical development set out m the Lewis case. It may
be conceded that such reasoning had a sound basis in the early days
of the Commonwealth, but in practical application today, the mterpretation of the statute is, at most, an anachronism in the law
Of course, if it be assumed that the claimant can trace his title to
a patent from the Commonwealth, the technique he must use in
realizing recovery is prescribed by statute, which provides" that
either party to the eviction action may request the court to appoint
a jury of twelve freeholders to meet on the property and ascertain the
value of the improvements as of the time the jury is empaneled.12 The
occupant is given a lien, which may be enforced in the usual way 1
It is important to note also that the measure of damages under the
statute is the value of the improvements, which will generally be
commensurate with the amount actually spent.
Before passing to a discussion of the claimant's remedy in equity,
it is interesting to note that the original Kentucky Occupying Claimants Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Green v Biddle,14 decided in 1823, it was held
that the act materially impaired the property rights of the rightful
owner of land given to them under a Compact between Kentucky
'Ky. REv.

STAT.,

sees. 381.470 et. seq. (1948).

KV. RE.

STAT.

see. 881.500(3) (1948).

"Ky.

REv. STAT.

see. 381.550 (1948).

"21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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and Virginia, and since the Compact was constitutional, the statute
was invalid. This case has never been overruled on this point, and,
in fact, has been cited m at least one later Federal case.' 5 A careful
search fails to disclose a single Kentucky case following the Supreme
Court decision, although one case mentions it m passing. 1 It would
seem, therefore, that Kentucky has a statute almost identical in substance to one that was declared unconstitutional over 125 years ago.
A possible explanation of this unusual fact is that the statute might
well have been considered to be unconstitutional only in regard to its
interference with property rights conferred under the Compact.
Equitable Remedy
Although there was some authority to the contrary, 17 the general
rule at common law was that equity would aid one who innocently
made improvements on land, and had no legal remedy against the
owner, by allowmg him to recover for the improvements, at least to
the extent that they had improved the value of the land.' 8 Kentucky
has been in accord with this general rule since the case of Barlow v
Bell,19 decided in 1818. The court, m this often cited case, by way
of dictum, stated the rule, "
but regarding courts of equity in
supplying the defects of the common law
we should have no
hesitation m relieving the possessor (sic) for improvements made upon
the land, whilst he bona fide considered it his own."2 0 Our court has
21
unequivocally followed this rule..
The theory of recovery in equity is based upon the fundamental
principle of unjust enrichment of the person who has been successful
in the eviction action,2 and therefore damages are determined by
the extent to which the value of the land has been enhanced by the
addition of the improvements..2 3 Of course, the occupant must have
improved in good faith,2 4 and the improvements must be of a permanent nature. 25 In many states where recovery m an equitable
Umon Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 162 (1910).
'Kentucky
0
Eastern Kentucky Coal Lands v. Commonwealth, 127 Ky. 667, 691, 106

S.W ' 260,
267 (1907).
Westerfield v. Williams, 59 Ind. 221 (1877); Nelson v. Allen, 9 Tenn. 360
(1830); note, 40 COL. L. REv. 145 (1940).
2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, sec. 625 (3rd ed., 1939).

8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh) 246 (1818).
" Id. at 246.
' Strunks Lane v. Anderson, 297 Ky. 578, 180 S.W 2d 385 (1944); Darnall
v. Jones, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2090, 72 S.W 1108 (1903); Hawlns v. Brown, 80 Ky.
186 (1882).
'8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 246 (1818); 31 C. J. 814.
' Strunks Lane v. Anderson, supra note 21.
24

Ibzd.
Darnall v. Jones, supra note 21.

NoTEs AND CoIMmENTs
action is permitted, the occupant must be the defendant m the eviction suit and assert his right to recover for improvements by way of
a counterclaim. 2 6 However, Kentucky also permits the occupant to
recover as a plamtiff.27 When the good faith occupant recovers judgment, he has a lien on the property which may be enforced in the
2
usual manner. s
In comparing the statutory and equitable remedies, it is obvious
that the damages allowed under the statute may be more advantageous to the claimant. In most cases, the actual value of the improvements will exceed the enhanced value of the improved land.
When, as m our hypothetical fact situation, A puts the $10,000 house
on the land, the value of the land may not have been enhanced to
that extent. If not, the claimant must stand the loss which is represented by the difference. If the Kentucky Court should have an
opportunity m the future to directly reconsider the limiting effect
of its interpretation of our statute, it is submitted that the difference
in damages factor should be weighed carefully and that the court
should decide whether as a matter of policy the claimant is to be
limited to damages based on unjust enrichment in equity
In conclusion, it appears that the reasons for limiting recovery
under the statute to those who are able to trace their title back to the
Commonwealth were primarily historical. They were probably justifiable historically, in view of the newness of the country, and the
possibility of overlapping patents, but today such reasons do not
exist. It is only reasonable and logical that the statute should be
broadened in its scope to aid all bona fide claimants, and this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Kentucky interpretation
stands alone. The Kentucky Court has indirectly recognized the
weakness of the interpretation by its readiness to apply equitable
principles to situations not covered by the statute. It may, however,
be argued that the overturning of a precedent over 130 years old
amounts to judicial legislation, and that the job of changing the
statute should be left up to the legislature.
If the foregoing analysis of Kentucky law is applied to the hypothetical situation assumed at the outset of this discussion, it is clear that
A, the claimant, has two general bases for recovery against C. If he
is able to trace his title back to an original grant from the state, he
may simply invoke the statutory remedy and procedure prescribed.
-31 C. J. 315.
'Parker v. Stephens, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh.) 197 (1920); Barlow v. Bell,
supra, note 19.

" Strunks Lane v. Anderson, supra, note 21.
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If, however, a search reveals that his title is not traceable back to a
patent, he must assert his claim m equity on a theory of unjust enrichment. In either event, he is entitled to a lien which he may enforce against the land.
ROBERT

F STEPHENS

THE VALIDITY OF THE GIFT OVER IN KENTUCKY
DETERMINED THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF ESTATE
IN FIRST TAKER
When one devises or bequeaths property absolutely, but purports
to provide m the same instrument for a gift over of so much of the
property as remains undisposed of by the first taker at death, the gift
over is invalid and of no effect. The theory underlying this well
established, long standing rule of property law is that a fee simple
has been given to the first taker, leaving nothing which can be the
subject of a gift over or remainder.' This view of the invalidity of
the gift over is consistent with fundamental concepts of property law,
but it is not always clear that the real intent of the testator is given
effect through this construction. An instrument containing his kind
of gift over provision often presents the courts with a difficult construction problem because the specific terms of the will may vary
considerably from case to case, depending on the definiteness with
which the estate of the first taker is described.
In comparatively recent years, a series of interesting cases has reopened the question of the validity of this type of gift over provision
in Kentucky and other states.2 Although the rule of property law
would seem to be unchanged, it is being applied with a new rule of
construction which places much more value on the intent of the
testator as drawn from the whole of the instrument. To this extent
at least, it seems particularly evident that the Kentucky Court has
broken away from the consequences of the old rule and will construe
the gift over valid when it finds that such is the intent of the maker
as drawn from the entire instrument.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the effect of these cases
against the background of earlier Kentucky decisions and to point
'2 Snms, LAW ON FuT--uRE INTERESTS, at 510 et. seq. (1936).
Stewart v. Moms, 313 Ky. 424 (S.W 2d 1950), 231 S.W 2d, 70; Jacobs
v. Barnard, 307 Ky. 321, 210 S.W 2d 972 (1948);

243, 210 S.W 2d 784 (1948).

Hanks

v. McDannell, 307 Ky.

